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Chasing Down Foreigners at the
French-Italian Border (Hautes-





1 Mountains, like the sea and the desert, are natural environments that are difficult for
humans to  tame and can be  dangerous,  even deadly.  For  migrants,  however,  these
spaces can be especially dangerous when “states think they can use the geopower [of
these  spaces]  to  transform  them  into  an  impassable  frontier”  (Heller,  Libération,
14/12/2017). In the Alps, between 1920 and 1950, the introduction of administrative
and  police  controls  at  the  French-Italian  border  made  transalpine  population
movements  that  had always  existed (Siestrunck,  2013)  illegal.  These  controls  drove
foreigners who were not part of official, government-supervised migration routes to
avoid police checkpoints by using more arduous mountain paths (Hanus, 2012). Since
the Schengen Agreement came into force in 1993, Italian workers have been allowed to
move  freely  between  Italy  and  France.  But  as  political  and  media  discourse  has
constructed hostile figures of “migrants” from the southern and eastern Mediterranean
region,  border  guards  have  been encouraged to  target  those  suspected of  posing a
“migration risk” (Hanus, 2012). According to Del Biaggio (Libération, 14/12/2017), the
increased control at the Schengen Area’s internal borders since 2011 has had the same
effect of politicising natural space in the Alps as in the Mediterranean.
2 In  the  winter  of  2016–2017,  the  Briançon region  (Hautes-Alpes,  France)  became an
important transit route for people seeking to emigrate from Italy to France. Most of
them were originally from sub-Saharan Africa. Since most of them went to France to
legally seek asylum or protection as minors, they should have been allowed to go to the
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nearest town to ask for protection.1 However, they were forced to cross the border
while avoiding police checks because the Border Police (PAF) refused to permit them to
enter.2 
As early as June 2017, the French state deployed exceptional police resources, such as
support from the mobile gendarmerie and the army, to block migrants seeking to cross
the border at Briançon. Police controls extended well beyond the area that had been
mentioned in the legislation3 and formed a “border zone” in the mountainous area
between the Col de l’Échelle, Montgenèvre and Briançon, and even below Briançon, on
the road to Gap, as shown on the map of mobile police practices. These practices sought
to prevent migrants from crossing the border and transformed the Briançon mountain
region into a “border zone” (Figure 1).
 
Figure 1. The Briançon border zone (2017–2019),a mobile police geography in the high mountains
Cartography, S. Bachellerie, 2019André Crous2020-09-14T16:52:00
3 Between  May  2018  and  May  2019,  following  the  development  of  such  a  control
mechanism, four people of African origin died, two others disappeared, and three were
seriously injured while trying to cross this mountainous border area (Tous Migrants,
May 2019). In 2018, the Briançon-based association Tous Migrants tallied 2,104 medical
consultations for people who had serious physical (frostbite,  shock, injuries,  broken
limbs etc.)  or  psychological  side-effects  from crossing the border.  According to  the
association, hundreds of arrests have been avoided thanks to the solidarity of residents
who criss-cross the mountains every night to help foreigners endangered by the police
presence. However, tourists and residents cross this same border mountain every day
without being in any danger. Thus, the process of transforming the high-alpine area
into a “police territory” (Jobard, 2001) operates differently depending on who crosses
it.
Chasing Down Foreigners at the French-Italian Border (Hautes-Alpes) as a Matt...
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 108-2 | 2020
2
4 For  the  full  duration of  my fieldwork,  in  2018  and 2019,  the  police  practices  were
mainly  mobile  and  consisted  of  patrolling  and  André
Crous2020-09-14T21:44:00tracking. The patrols covered the territory with a ubiquitous
police  presence.  The  tracking  targeted  the  populations  whose  identity  had  to  be
checked.  This  check  was  carried  out  in  two  stages:  First,  the  police  identified  the
“suspect” before chasing them and seizing them. Identity checks at the border only
involved individuals identified by the police as potentially being “illegal migrants”. The
racial  targeting  of  individuals  by  law  enforcement  agencies  is  not  necessarily
ideological: It can be explained by a simple “pragmatic racialism” (Fassin, 2010) whose
goal is to increase the “efficiency” of the controls. However, for the people undergoing
the  controls,  these  discretionary  practices  are  experienced  as  racial,  even  racist,
discrimination, as I was told by Francis*4 and Christian* in May 2019 and in informal
discussions with people who crossed the border in 2018 and 2019. They revealed that,
“rather  than  maintaining  public  order,  the  presence  of  police  patrols  ultimately
ensures  the  reproduction of  social  order.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  way of  reminding
everyone of their place and, in particular, their place in relation to the state and those
responsible  for  implementing  its  repressive  policy”  (Fassin,  2010,  p. 113).  In  this
respect, police questioning is a “reminder of national order” but also of “social” and
“racial” order (Guénebeaud, 2017, p. 428). 
5 I analyse the recurring examples of police tracking at the border by using Chamayou’s
(2010) theory of the “human hunt”, which is a technology of power that reaffirms an
already  existing  relationship  of  domination.  Instead  of  taking  the  form  of  a
confrontation between two equal parties, the balance of power is marked by a radical
asymmetry of weapons, and the enemy is not recognised as an equal but as prey. In his
work, Chamayou plays on the double meaning of the word “hunt” in French: Thus,
“chasse”  as  expulsion,  which  involves  making  undesirable  populations  disappear,
would complement “chasse” as seizing, which means immobilising a prey in order to
catch it. The tracking of foreigners or the poor as a technology of domination is rooted
in colonial genealogy, and delegating the state’s hunting power to a specific body may
be labelled as the birth certificate of the modern police (Chamayou, 2010).
6 Thus,  police  chasing people  on the  move in  the  Briançon border  area  reveals  how
contemporary  borders  produce  social  and  racial  categories  by  denying  some social
groups the right to move or exist in space and exposing them to the violence of that
space. My analysis falls within the field of border studies, which, since the 1990s, have
denaturalised the existence of national borders by focusing on the process of border
construction (“bordering”). Borders are understood as a way not only to control the
flows  but  also  to  create  hierarchical  social  categories  between  social  groups
(“ordering”) and produce “othering” and the social and spatial exclusion of dominated
groups  (Van  Houtum,  Van  Naersen,  2001).  Guarded  by  police  officers  who  are
responsible, among other things, for “policing” the public, the border also maintains
political and social “order”. It legitimises the categories necessary to exercise power
(the state and the nation, the founders of sovereign power) and endorses the different
dominations of class, race and gender (Guénebeaud, 2017), as well as the demarcation
between those who have the right to mobility and those who are denied access to a
particular space.
7 First, I will describe in detail the practices that border control officers use to target the
individuals who are to be arrested, and then I will show that this targeting is based on
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social and racial categories whose hierarchical order it helps to reproduce. Next, I will
show that police tracking leads to symbolic and physical violence against foreigners on
the move, as well as these people’s disappearance from the public space.
8 This research is based on a field survey conducted in Briançon and Val de Suse, where I
arrived in March 2018 for my master’s thesis research (ENS de Lyon). For one and a half
years,  I  participated as  an observer (Soulé,  2007) with exiled people in the Franco-
Italian solidarity movement, which allowed me to observe the police system and its
effects on people on the move in real time. I was one of the “solidarity marauders”
travelling through the mountains to observe police violence and offer assistance to lost
migrants. I lived in solidarity reception centres, where I collected eyewitness accounts
from people arriving on the French side or being escorted back to the Italian side of the
border. Unfortunately, as I was personally identified as a member of associative groups
opposed to police work and whose activity was illegal, I couldn’t conduct interviews
with control officers. I completed my investigation with 45 interviews with residents
from the border area and local economic actors, who witness the border work every
day.
 
The targeting of foreigners ‘to be arrested’
9 During  my  fieldwork  (2018–2019),  I  met  different  tourists  visiting  the  village  of
Montgenèvre. These people did not even know that the border was being controlled, as
it was invisible to them. Their vehicles were never stopped at the border crossing, and
they never underwent an identity check when travelling in the area. I asked about this
situation: How is it that some people are unaware of the existence of the border, while
others are systematically exposed to it?
10 The strengthening of border controls began with a “spectacular” phase that ran from
spring  to  winter  2017  and  included  putting  up  military  roadblocks  in  the  Col  de
l’Échelle and the Clarée Valley and systematically checking vehicles. Military and police
patrols in all the villages in the valley, along with helicopter surveillance, disrupted the
landscape and transformed it, according to many inhabitants, into a “war zone”.5 But
with the start of the winter tourist season, controls were restricted to particular spaces
and times.  They were suspended in the Clarée Valley (the main road to  Briançon),
moved closer to the borderline and the PAF post and increased at night. The police
strategies I observed from this period onwards focused on intelligence concerning the
crossing routes,  which enabled them to pick up “potentially  illegal” persons at  the
spots and times when they were most likely to be found. This marked the beginning of
a  strategy  that  targeted  foreigners  who  had  crossed  illegally  rather  than  one  that
visibly  and  systematically  enforced  control  over  the  border.  Throughout  my
observations of the crossings at Montgenèvre, I found that at the border crossing, a
simple  glance  by  the  PAF  officer  at  the  passengers  in  the  vehicle  was  enough  to
determine whether or not there would be an identity check. During mobile patrols in
the  border  area,  the  criteria  used  by  the  PAF  officers  to  target  individuals  “to  be
checked” were the following: carrying a backpack or suitcase; travelling at night and/
or in a group; showing signs of fear, hiding; and having a skin colour identified as black.
Francis*, who crossed the French-Italian border in August 2018, explains that:
Already,  for  the borders,  you can see it  directly,  at  the level  of  controls.  When
you’re on a bus from Oulx [in Italy] to Briançon [at the border], when the police get
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on the bus, they already have their targets. When they get on, they look around. If
they see white people somewhere, they don’t really check. They go directly to the
blacks. And also (...) if you go alone, or you pass with white people, there won’t be
any control of your car (...). But, if you come, you only have one black guy in the
car, you’re controlled.6
11 Between 2017 and 2019, closer cooperation between the French and Italian police forces
bolstered  the  targeting  logic.  I  observed  that  the  carabinieri  present  in  Oulx  and
Clavière, where a bus was leaving for Briançon, informed their PAF counterparts of the
number of “potential” migrants, as well as the paths that the persons appeared to be
taking. At the border post, the PAF asked the bus drivers of the cross-border line how
many people had got off at Clavière; the drivers I interviewed7 said they felt obligated
to answer the police when questioned. The PAF also cooperated with the management
of the Montgenèvre ski resort to involve first-aid trackers. Their bosses asked them via
the central  radio to  “go and see” when “migrants  are there”8.  “It’s  not  necessarily
[because] they’re in danger”, says Quentin*, a tracker in Montgenèvre. “Last year, the
PAF didn’t have scooters, so if they spotted [people], they could easily send us.” For the
police, relying on rescue trackers has many strategic advantages: They are placed at
different  locations  in  the  resort,  move  quickly  on  skis  and  snowmobiles  and  can
communicate instantly by radio.  Their  indirect  participation in border surveillance,
therefore,  allows the entire ski area to be marked out as an identification zone for
“migrants”. Finally, residents in the village of Montgenèvre said that many people were
being  reported  to  the  PAF,  which  created  an  atmosphere  of  fear  and suspicion
throughout the community. These anonymous calls to the PAF led to numerous arrests
of foreigners and sometimes of citizens who were in solidarity with them9. Thanks to
these  police  or  civilian  reports,  rather  than by  randomly  spreading  out  across  the
entire border area, the police forces could focus on the locations where the targeted
persons had been spotted and simply “pick them up”. This is how a patrol –marking out
“police  territory”  (Jobard,  2001)  by  trying  to  identify  a  target  among  the  crowd–
becomes a hunt –the chasing of the prey.
 
The social construction of racial identification
12 I was surprised by the sense of obviousness with which the police and their informants
seemed to identify “migrants” in the border area with just a glance –all the more so
since, in a tourist resort,  foreigners are not unusual.  In Montgenèvre, however, the
tourist  offer  is  aimed  at  the  middle  and  wealthy  classes,  and  the  “international”
clientele comes mainly from what are called the “northern” countries (Italy, Belgium,
United Kingdom, Poland, Russia, Israel etc.).  Montgenèvre resembles what Anderson
(2014) characterises as a “white space”: It is a space reserved for the middle and upper
classes, which, in the context of structural social inequality, comprises light-skinned
people, whose presence there is constructed as “normal”. For example, Audrey*, an
Australian woman living in Montgenèvre, notes the gap between her own condition
and that of the racialised foreigners whose legality is questioned and are subject to
controls:  “I  can’t  understand  why  this  is  so  scandalous.  I’ve  been  living  here  for
25 years, I’m a foreigner, and I’m white; I’ve never had any worries.” As Dorlin notes
(2009):  “‘White’  refers  rather  to  enjoying  what  one  might  call  a  certain  ‘social
transparency’ (…)”, which implies that “we don’t have to endorse any infamous mark
[of otherness].”
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13 For his part, Francis* explains how the mere fact of being “black” in the border zone
seems to trigger police intervention:
14 “The police at the borders... treat us differently. When you’re going through the woods
to avoid the police, when you get arrested with whites, they never ask the whites for
papers. We were arrested, with a small group in the forest,  at the border, with the
whites, they targeted the blacks, asked us for papers, ‘What are you doing here?’ and all
that. And what’s just as bad is that there are often – even among us – blacks who are
French! (...) We can pass with white friends, but they control the French blacks.”10
15 Thus,  police  identification  reproduces  social  categories  rooted  in  the  collective
imagination,  which  helps  to  normalise  “white”  bodies  while  stigmatising  “black”
bodies.
16 It has happened that people on the move, understanding that the work of the border is
based  on  categorising  individuals,  subvert  social  norms  as  a  strategy  for  crossing.
Bauman’s (1997) theory,  which presents the “tourist” as the mirror opposite of  the
“vagrant” in migration, has been put into practice at the Montgenèvre resort. During
my observation sessions there, people who had the stereotypical attitudes of “tourists”
(moving around in the middle of the day, in the middle of the village, having a drink
out in the open, wearing sportswear, hiking boots, a ski suit, skis or snowboard) were
not stopped by the police. Nobody would give them a second look, regardless of their
skin colour. Thus, for a racialised person who had crossed the border illegally, playing
the role of a well-to-do tourist in Montgenèvre is way to “pass” (Guénebeaud, 2017)
that makes it possible to escape the police’s racial focus and, thus, literally cross the
border without being targeted for arrest.
17 In the course of my investigation, all light-skinned people on the move (Kurds, Arabs,
Kabyles, Afghans, Kosovars) who played the role of ‘tourist’ managed to escape control
by the PAF. However, many “black” Africans who used the same strategy were not as
successful. This confirms the prevalence of racial discrimination in border crossings: If
‘white’  migrants can get away with it  in the same way as tourists  and residents,  it
means police pursuits are exclusively reserved for people perceived as ‘black.’ Based on
their experience of what they see on a daily basis, many observers who are involved in
solidarity with the exiled describe the PAF’s control practices as “black hunts.”11
 
Tracking as a technology of domination
18 Tracking as a police technique prescribes the gestures and behaviours of the person it
identifies as the “prey” (Chamayou, 2010). It compels the chased persons to take more
risks when walking in the mountains, to go into hiding (thus depriving themselves of
potential help from passers-by), to wait in the cold, to lie down in the snow and to take
detours on other slopes while running in the dark12. For example, in March 2018, at
-10°C, a person told me that they had been lying in a puddle of frozen water in the
village of Montgenèvre for three hours because they were hiding from police patrols.
19 Between  March  and  June  2018,  I  transcribed  14 accounts  of  police  “chases”,  which
happened  almost  every  week.  The  border  control  officers  were trying  to  submit
individuals  whom  they  regarded  as  “illegal  migrants”  to  identity  controls  after
apprehending them in the mountains. These scenes often took place in the dark, so the
control  officers  were  equipped  with  night  vision  equipment.  Because  the  targeted
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individuals did not have such equipment, they sometimes fell, got separated from their
group, lost their bearings, were exposed to hypothermia and drowning etc. The most
tragic case was the death of Blessing Matthews, who drowned in the Durance River
during a police chase on 7 May 2018. On the same day, I had recorded an interview with
Aboubakar* in Briançon. Having been wounded in the leg, he was limping heavily:
A - (...) Because the police were chasing us. [...] We took the road, there, after the
border, there. The police were there with the binoculars, while we were lying in the
snow. We were lying in it. When the police came, I got up, I started running. Three
people followed me. [...] When we André Crous2020-09-15T10:27:00got the tar back,
we had to walk little by little, little by little, little by little, little by little. When you
see the vehicle, you hide, when you see a vehicle, you hide. [...] [In the morning], we
saw the policeman entering the village.  To surprise us,  in front of us,  like that.
There were four of us. Yet he followed the three people. I went upstairs and hid in
the caves there. He grabbed the three people there. [...] He caught them.
20 Some  eyewitness  accounts  also  describe  a  variation  of  chases  (“ambushes”),  which
happens when a vehicle chases a person through the forest to lead them to the place
where a group of policemen are waiting to “pick them up”13.
21 During my conversations in Clavière or Oulx with people who were about to cross the
border, I found that most of them refused any crossing strategy other than hiding at
night through the mountains. They would immediately adopt the posture of prey that
would be imposed on them by the police strategy of tracking. More in-depth exchanges
with people who have crossed this border suggested to me that this attitude was rooted
in the traumas they had inherited from interactions with the police in their countries
of origin or in the process of migrating through Italy or Libya. According to Francis*,
people who have already crossed several borders anticipate police arrest, and it is this
fear that leads them to run or climb in the mountains to avoid controls, increasing the
risks they take and, thus, putting themselves in danger14. Of the thousands of people
who  crossed  the  border  during  my  investigation,  only  a  few,  convinced  of  the
legitimacy  of  their  presence  and  passage, attempted  to  present  themselves  at  the
border crossing and claim their right to enter France15. However, these people were the
most  exposed to  police  violence (the cases  of  police  violence reported in  2018 had
almost always been preceded by an act of resistance on the part of the person arrested:
refusal to give fingerprints, refusal to get into the car that drove them back to Clavière
etc.).
22 This constant and anticipated fear is explained by the fact that this border tracking is
part  of  a  “regime of  pervasive violence” (Babels,  2018)  in  Europe against  migrants.
Following  arrest,  the  legal  violations16 that  take  place  inside  the  PAF  border  post
continue the symbolic violence by denying the arrested persons the status of citizens
and, therefore,  of  political  subjects.  Psychological  violence  (insults,  threats)  and
physical  violence  (robbery,  beatings)17 also  take  place  there:  They  are  ‘degradation
ceremonies’ (Blanchard, 2014) that have the effect of producing humiliation. Those who
are victims of such violence are not entitled to any assistance, either medical or legal,
to  defend themselves.  The effects  on individuals  of  this  continuum of  physical  and
psychological  violence against them can be felt  over the long term: For example,  a
person who had crossed the  border,  returning to  Briançon by chance a  year  later,
suffered a psycho-traumatic crisis that put him in hospital for several weeks18. Thus,
the hunt at the border is  the inaugural mark of “government through anxiety” for
Chasing Down Foreigners at the French-Italian Border (Hautes-Alpes) as a Matt...
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 108-2 | 2020
7
undesirable foreigners (Chamayou, 2010), which seeks to constantly remind them of
their illegitimacy and deprive them of their capacity for resistance.
 
Tracking as disappearance; the struggle for visibility
23 Tracking is also part of another “technology of violence” that is used against those
crossing  the  border  illegally  and  involves  the  programmed  disappearance of  their
bodies and trajectories in space (Boyce, 2012). While police work in the border zone of
the Briançon area does not put a stop to the flow of illegal immigrants, contrary to
what it claims to do, it has the concrete effect of chasing undesirable people out of the
frequented areas of the resort. The zones where people are apprehended are the forests
and  the  mountain  areas  away  from  inhabited  areas.  In  addition,  checks  are
concentrated in closed spaces, like the border post, where dozens of people sometimes
crowd together19, removed from the public space and the outside. According to Tina*, a
seasonal worker in Montgenèvre:  “That’s how it is,  the [foreign] people who are in
Montgenèvre,  the  gendarmes  arrive  and...”  Her  silence  is  followed  by  a  sweeping
gesture  in  which  she  mimes  the  disappearance  of  migrants  in  the  eyes  of  the
population.
24 The management of the border work also has a temporal dimension to it: The police are
deployed  in  a  massive  show  of  force  outside  the  tourist  seasons  and  in  a  more
controlled  manner  “in  season”20.  Since  the  summer  of  2018,  PAF  officers  have
increasingly  resorted  to  using  civilian  equipment  during  the  day  (hiker’s  outfits,
unmarked vehicles) and incorporating the resort’s workers and infrastructures into the
control system: All of this makes the police presence more discrete. Residents who go
out at night on the tracks and footpaths of Montgenèvre, specifically in the areas where
people  pass  who have entered the  country  illegally,  in  order  to  come to  their  aid,
witness a whole different scene.  One of them, Boris*,  has watched explicit  tracking
scenes:
“Races – chases – I’ve seen a lot of them. I would say, manhunts more than chases.
They were coming in cars like cowboys, screaming. It’s happened to me at least a
dozen or 15 times –on snowmobiles on the ski slopes or in cars on the roads. They
were chasing them. I’ve seen demented scenes in the streets of Montgenèvre.”21
25 Thus, the radical discrepancy between police practices at day and those at night can be
understood  as  a  double  attempt  to  conceal  the  political  use  of  violence  from
“legitimate” populations, allowing it to be deployed in an unconstrained and obvious
manner against “undesirable” populations.
26 For this reason, the collectives and associations that have been formed in Briançon and
Val de Suse in support of migrants and against migration policies are actively working
to “make visible” in the public (and media) space the daily experiences of foreigners
who are subjected to police arrests. To reintegrate this violence into the concrete space
where it takes place, various events were organised at the ski resort in 2018 and 2019:
Banners were put up on the tourist infrastructure, and stories of police violence were
read out loud or distributed in the form of  leaflets.  These activist  practices aim to
directly attack the process of invisibilisation that characterises migrants in the border
area by claiming the legitimacy of their presence in Briançon and elsewhere.
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Figure 2. A protest organised by various French and Italian activists at the Montgenèvre resort after
the death of T
Photograph, S. Bachellerie, 23 February 2019
 
Conclusion
27 The targeting strategy has the effect of radically dissociating two types of experiences
lived  by  foreigners  in  this  mountainous  area:  The  first  is  one  of  pleasure  and
entertainment  (for  “international  tourists”);  the  other  is  one  of  flight  and  fear
produced by police chases (for illegal foreigners, mostly from Africa and the Middle
East).  The phenomenon of the partitioning of space produced in the border zone is
similar to what Fanon (1962) describes as the colonial world’s “compartmentalisation of
the world”: “The colonised world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the border, is
indicated by barracks and police stations” (Fanon 1962:47).  Making people who are
illegal in the eyes of the law invisible is a typical mechanism of the colonial context,
which involves concealing the violence deployed in “the colonies” from the gaze of
“the  metropolis”  (Gregory,  2004;  Butler,  2002).  According  to  Gregory  (2004),  this
“colonial present” takes the form of a “war without witnesses”.
28 The practices of control in the Briançon border zone confirm the theories of Butler
(2002). By going beyond Agamben’s (1998) notion of “abandoning” illegal migrants to a
“bare  life”,  Butler  shows  that  authorities  select  the  bodies  exposed  to  violence
according to criteria of class and race. Mbembe (2006) echoes her views by claiming
that black bodies are the target of “necropolitics”. People who are migrating are not
only  “abandoned” to  the violence of  the  mountain range but  also  forced by police
practices to risk their lives in deadly spaces. The violence they experience is part of a
“system of racialized management” of the border (Rosas, 2006).
29 Within  border  studies,  new  approaches  from  feminist  theory  challenge  the
representation  of  borders  as  a  tool  of  sovereign  power  that  strikes  subjects  in  a
unilateral  way  (Donzelli,  2013).  On  the  contrary,  by  presenting  borders  as
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“borderscapes” crossed by contestations, they claim that border violence allows the
emergence  of  “political  creativity”  (Brambilla,  Jones,  2019).  However,  tracking  as  a
prism analysing social relations at the border invites us to question this idea. According
to  Chamayou (2010),  tracking prescribes  the  roles  of  predator  and prey,  which are
distributed in advance by relations of domination. In the specific space-time of a border
zone that can be crossed according to conditions set by police tracking, and as long as
the hunt lasts, the headlong rush and the constant fear it imposes on the hunted leave
little room for rebellion.
30 By updating and reinforcing racial  and class hierarchies,  the practices of  migration
control  at  the  upper  Alpine  border  play  an  active  role  in  the  process  of
compartmentalising the contemporary world and, thus, maintaining an order whose
genealogy is colonial.  This social and racial policing can be understood through the
idea  that  the  hunt  for  workers  begins  in  the  process  of  imperialist  acquisition  of
resources  and labour  power over  the  entire  planet  in  the  service  of  the  globalised
capitalist economy (Chamayou, 2010). Therefore, for people who can no longer ensure
their subsistence in their country of origin, the act of leaving for another country could
be  considered  the  first  step  in  chasing  migrant  workers.  This  plays  out  both
symbolically and concretely when the police hunt them down as they cross the Alps.
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Reports :
Tous Migrants, 2019.— « L’accueil des personnes exilées dans le Briançonnais et les Hautes-Alpes,








1. Asylum seekers arriving in France must start their procedure at the Reception Platform for
Asylum Seekers (Plateforme d’Accueil des Demandeurs d’asile, or PADA) in the regional capitals.
Unaccompanied minors must go to Children’s Social Welfare (Aide Sociale à l’Enfance) at the
Departmental Prefecture.
2. Based on my observations, the frequency of refusals varied over time.
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3. A planned 10-km strip of land around the border points (Article L. 213-3-1 of Law No. 2018-778
of 10 September 2018)
4. All first names with an asterisk have been changed to respect the respondents’ anonymity.
5. Interviews with residents of Briançon and Névache, March 2018
6. Recorded discussion with Francis*, May 2019
7. Informal discussions with three bus drivers, January–April 2019.
8. Interviews with three first-aid trackers from the resort of Montgenèvre and four lift workers,
March–April 2019
9. Eyewitness accounts by people taken back to the border collected on the Italian side, winter
2018–2019; Interview with B., Montgenèvre resident, April 2019.
10. Recorded discussion with Francis*, May 2019
11. Interview with residents of the border zone, March–June 2018
12. All of these cases were observed on a regular basis between March and June 2018.
13. Interview on 17/05/2018 with H., "caught" then deported to the border
14. Discussion with Francis*, 26/05/2019
15. Collection of eyewitness accounts from persons who had returned, April–June 2018
16. These violations are detailed in Anafé’s report, Persona Non Grata, Consequences of Security and
Migration Policies on the French-Italian Border, published in November 2018.
17. Collection of  eyewitness  accounts  from people  who were refused entry,  April–June 2018;
communiqués from the “Chez Jésus” collective, May, June, August 2018.
18. Case recounted by a volunteer from the Le Mamba association in Marseille, May 2019
19. Interviews in Oulx with people arrested and returned to Montgenèvre, January–March 2019
20. Interviews with resort workers, January–April 2019
21. Interview with Boris*, Briançon resident and “marauder”, March 2018
ABSTRACTS
In the town of Briançon (Hautes-Alpes),  on the French side of the French-Italian border,  the
border police (PAF) controls for those who have crossed the border illegally by operating on a
discretionary basis. Mobile police practices include tracking down racialised people across the
mountains. These practices expose illegal migrants to dangers inherent in the high-mountain
environment  and  are  part  of  a  continuum  of  police  and  administrative  violence  committed
against them. Migration control in the Briançon area demonstrates how the mountains can be
integrated into power strategies that reinforce the dominance of certain social groups. It also
shows that borders today, which facilitate the mobility of “legitimate” foreign populations and
hinder  that  of  “undesirable”  foreign  populations,  function  by  identifying  individuals  and
differentiating them on the basis of race and class. The persistence of “police hunts for illegal
humans” (Chamayou, 2010) as a control technology helps us, on the whole, to understand how
migration control on France’s borders forms part of a “colonial present” (Gregory, 2004).
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